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Abstract
Some studies argue that credit booms that end up in banking crises are usually longer
than those that end without creating havoc. However, they do not test this hypothesis
empirically. This paper employs a duration model to assess the relationship between the
length of credit booms and their outcome. The empirical analysis shows that credit
expansions that end in banking crisis are indeed more prone to last longer than those
that end softly. Furthermore, differences in length patterns are found to start in the
build-up phase, extending to the unwinding phase of credit cycles.
Keywords Credit booms . Duration analysis . Banking crisis
JEL Classification C41 . E51
1 Introduction
The growing importance of credit in the day to day economic activity of individuals,
firms and governments has been a clear trend in recent decades. Today, credit is
everywhere and stands as an essential tool to promote investment and economic
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prosperity. However, history has taught us that this apparent virtuous cycle eventually
comes to an end with unforeseen consequences to the economy. It is a dangerous
gamble as showed by the recent global financial triggered, in part, by a swift increase of
mortgage loans in the United States. Some credit booms are indeed followed by
moments of intense financial distress banking and economic crises (Jordà et al. 2011;
Schularick and Taylor 2012; Boissay et al. 2016; Jordà et al. 2016). Our data reports
this to be the case for one out of four credit expansions identified from 1975 to 2016.
The significant number of disaster events contributed decisively to the belief that credit
booms need to be monitored and better understood.
One fundamental question regarding credit expansions is how to anticipate their benign
ormalignant nature, and researchers have tried to identify differences between them but with
limited success. All in all, the most consistent conclusion found in the literature is that
harmful credit booms (or bad credit booms) tend to exhibit larger magnitudes and longer
durations. Barajas et al. (2009) found that around 40% of credit expansions lasting between
9 and 12 years end up in a crisis and for those over 13 years this is a virtual certainty. When
analyzing the length of credit booms, Arena et al. (2015) report that approximately half of
those that end in a banking crisis last for over six years while only 25% of benign booms last
this long. The conclusion that longer expansions have a higher probability of being
associated with a banking crisis is reported by several studies (see Gourinchas et al. 2001;
Castro and Kubota 2013; Dell’Ariccia et al. 2016; Meng and Gonzalez 2017). However, as
far as we are concerned, only Castro and Kubota (2013) use adequate statistical methods as
an attempt to address this issue. Relying on a continuous-timeWeibull duration model, they
provide evidence of positive duration dependence in credit booms, in general, and in those
that end badly, in particular.
This paper contributes to the literature on credit booms in various directions and goes
beyond Castro and Kubota’s (2013) work in several ways. First, we employ a discrete-time
duration model that allows for the inclusion of (time-varying) economic explanatory
variables. This provides a more complete control of the economic environment. Second,
we use a different set of criteria to define episodes of credit booms (different thresholds and
detrending techniques). Third, regarding bad credit booms, Castro and Kubota (2013) only
show the presence of duration dependence in their dynamics; in this study we move a step
forward and compare bad with good credit booms dynamics. This approach makes it
possible to provide the (lacking) statistical evidence that bad credit booms tend to last longer
than good ones. Fourth, we extend the duration analyses to the build-up and unwinding
phases of the credit cycle, assessing whether they are fundamentally alike or not. This
particular analysis also allows us to identify whether different patterns emerge when credit
cycles are split into those that generate harmful outcomes and those that do not. Finally, we
rely on a more extensive quarterly dataset covering 67 countries from 1975q1 to 2016q4.
The empirical analysis provides strong evidence that harmful credit expansions are
indeed more prone to last longer than those that land softly. It also shows that their
build-up and unwinding phases differ, thus generating distinct credit cycles. This study
concludes that duration can be used as an early warning instrument to evaluate the
benign or malignant nature of credit booms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the literature while
Section 3 presents the econometric model. Section 4 describes the data and methodol-
ogy. The empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6
concludes.
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1.1 Literature Review
The investigation on credit booms has been conducted mainly through data analysis and the
literature has highlighted the association between credit expansions and macroeconomic
dynamics. Rises in capital inflows, productivity shocks and general improvements in the
economy, allied to excessive optimism, are found to explain the build-up of such events (see,
for instance, Mendoza and Terrones 2008, 2012; Dell’Ariccia et al. 2016; Amri et al. 2016;
Avdjiev et al. 2018; Castro and Martins 2019). Additionally, financial reforms associated
with financial liberalization and domestic differences such as expansionary monetary and
fiscal policies, less flexible exchange rate regimes, debt composition and weak supervision
of the banking system are also associated with periods of abnormal credit growth (Elekdag
and Wu 2013; Arena et al. 2015; Dell’Ariccia et al. 2016; Avdjiev et al. 2018).
Estimating a fixed effects logit model over a panel of developed and developing
countries, Castro and Martins (2019) show that credit booms depend not only on the
quantity of credit but are also influenced by its relative price. Likewise, economic growth
and economic openness also build-up the conditions for the appearance of lending booms.
They also report that economies that can generate more liquidity are less likely to be affected
by credit booms.
Banking crisis are often associated with excessive credit expansions. The circum-
stances in which this happens has been an important topic of research. Dell’Ariccia
et al. (2016) point out that a higher level of financial depth increases the probability of a
boom ending badly. Arena et al. (2015) found that when credit booms end in banking
crisis, macroeconomic fluctuations seem to be larger and exhibit more sudden declines.
According to Meng and Gonzalez (2017), this is also the case when the dimension of
the financial sector grows, particularly above macroeconomic consistent levels. Yet,
they report no association between bad booms and macroeconomic and financial
policies – exception made to the quality of regulations and supervision of the banking
system.
In a recent work, Castro and Martins (2018) found that credit booms that are driven by
high levels of capital inflows and/or by increases in the ratio of credit to deposits and those
that are generally supported by lower interest rates tend to have an increased likelihood of
ending up in a full blown banking crisis. However, the opposite seems to happen when right
wing parties are in office. The authors also report that, bad credit expansions are less likely to
occur under the watch of more independent Central Banks. However, the literature has
struggled to find consistent differences between good and bad credit expansions. Some
papers – like, for example, Gourinchas et al. (2001) – actually report no relevant changes in
key macroeconomic variables between them. Overall, the difficulty in finding consistent
predictors that can support or extend theoretical models has restricted the ability for
empirical studies to present more credible policy recommendations.
Nevertheless, most studies seem to agree that credit booms gone badly are associated
with larger magnitudes and longer durations, but to reach this conclusion most of them rely
on comparative descriptive statistics and graphical analysis. The exceptions are Meng and
Gonzales (2017) and Castro and Kubota (2013). The former collapse their panel data into a
cross-section and estimate probit models where the dependent variable takes value of 1 if a
credit boom episode is followed within two years by a banking crisis (and 0 otherwise) and
add to the regressors a variable measuring the length of each boom. The later uses a
continuous-timeWeibull duration model to confirm the length nexus of credit booms. None
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of them provides a comparative analysis between the duration dynamics of bad and good
credit booms. This paper embraces that endeavour and confirms statistically the existence of
differences in the duration pattern of good and bad lending expansions.
1.2 Econometric Model
For the duration analysis developed in this study, we rely on Prentice and Gloeckler’s
(1978) discrete-time version of the proportional hazards duration model,1 with the
respective discrete-time hazard function given by2:
Pit ¼ Pr Ti ¼ tjTi≥ t; xit½  ¼ 1−e−hteβ
0xit ¼ 1−e−eλtþβ0xit
⇔ln −ln 1−Pitð Þ½  ¼ λt þ β0xit
ð1Þ
where T is the duration variable and t denotes the moment in time when the value of
each independent variable is observed. Given that time is discrete, t corresponds to the
amount of time (measured in quarters) during which the event has been “running” or
has been “active”, i.e. the amount of time since the beginning of the event or the time
span.3 This model is equivalent to the complementary log-log (or cloglog) function,
where λt(= ln ht) represents the logarithm of an unspecified (baseline hazard) function
of time; xit is a vector of time-varying regressors. One suitable and quite popular
specification for λt is the discrete-time analogue to the continuous-time Weibull model,
which yields:
λt ¼ lnht ¼ αþ p−1ð Þlnt ð2Þ
where p parameterizes the duration dependence parameter.4 If p > 1 (p < 1), the
conditional probability of a turning point occurring increases (decreases) as the phase
gets older, i.e. there is positive (negative) duration dependence; if p = 1 there is no
duration dependence. Therefore, by estimating p, we can test for duration dependence
in credit boom phases.
Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) and Allison (1982) show that the discrete-time log-
likelihood function for a sample of i = 1, ..., n spells/booms can be written as follows:
lnL ¼ ∑
n
i¼1
∑
j¼1
ti
yitln
Pij
1−Pij
 
þ ∑
n
i¼1
∑
j¼1
ti
ln 1−Pij
 
; ð3Þ
1 Although the time spell of credit booms is a continuous-time process, the available data are discrete
(quarters). In addition, the potential conditioning factors of their duration vary over time. Hence, discrete-
time duration methods are more suitable for this study than continuous-time ones. For examples of empirical
applications in Economics see Castro (2010), Agnello et al. (2013), Castro and Martins (2013) and Agnello
et al. (2015, 2018).
2 The hazard function measures the rate at which credit boom spells end at time t, given that they lasted until
that moment. In other words, it measures the probability of exiting from a boom state in moment t conditional
on the length of time in that state. This function helps to characterise the path of duration dependence.
3 Countries do not experience a credit boom at the same time: sometimes, there is partial overlapping; other
times, no overlapping occurs. Hence, we have different starting points for the events/spans across countries.
4 In the continuous-time Weibull duration model the baseline hazard is ht = γptp-1, where p > 0, γ > 0 and γ is
a constant (for details, see Castro 2010). Hence, λt = lnht = ln(γptp-1) = α + (p-1)lnt, with α = ln(γp) and
t = DurCreditBoom.
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where the dummy variable yit is equal to 1 if credit boom i in a given country ends at
time t, and 0 otherwise. We estimate this model by Maximum Likelihood, substituting
Pij by (1) and λt by (2). This implies that the discrete-time log-likelihood function will
be conditional on both time and the conditions observed for the different control
variables at time t.
1. Data and methodology
To proceed with the duration analysis, we collected quarterly data for 67 countries from
1975q1 to 2016q4 on real credit.5 We use quarterly information on credit because it is more
appropriate to assess cyclical movements and volatility associated with crisis episodes. The
measure of credit considered is the deposit money bank claims on the private sector taken
from the line 22d of the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). The amount of credit
is expressed in real terms by dividing the nominal credit by the CPI index.
The next step is to identify credit booms to compute the respective duration. Following
Castro andMartins (2019), we use the criteria developed by Gourinchas, et al. (2001) – and
later updated by Barajas et al. (2009) – to identify credit booms.6 This method identifies a
credit boom by looking at the growth of credit in the economy, proxied by the bank credit to
the private sector as a percentage of GDP, L/y. Thus, Gourinchas et al. (2001) define a credit
boom as an episode where the deviation of the ratio L/y from a country-specific trend in
country i at period t (with the trend being calculated up to that period t) exceeds a
determined threshold. In particular, we define that a credit boom takes place if the ratio
of private credit to GDP meets the following condition: the deviation of L/y from its
estimated trend is greater than 1.5 times its standard deviation or the year-on-year growth
rate of L/y exceeds 20%. The HP-filter is used to compute the trend, where the value of
Lagrange Multiplier employed in the maximization problem is λ = 1600 (for quarterly
data). By organizing the data into spells of credit we can compute their duration, i.e. the
number of quarters inwhich a country is experiencing a credit boom (DurCreditBoom). For
comparative purposes, we also consider other more restrictive thresholds: 1.75 and 2.0.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for the number of episodes identified with
this method (Obs.), their mean duration (Mean), standard deviation (S.D.), minimum
(Min.) and maximum (Max.), accounting for different thresholds: 1.5, 1.75 and 2.0. OECD
and Non-OECD countries and different periods of time are also considered in this analysis.
Simultaneously, we distinguish between credit booms that end up in a systemic banking
crisis from those that benefit from a soft landing. Like Barajas et al. (2009), we define the
first episodes as bad credit booms and the others as good credit booms.
Based on the identification strategy of Barajas et al. (2009), we consider bad booms as
credit booms that are followed by a systemic banking crisis either immediately or within
eight quarters of their final period. Episodes of systemic banking crises are obtained from
Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2010, 2012), extrapolated to quarterly data and updated for the
more recent years following their procedure.7
5 For the list of countries see footnotes in Table 1.
6 Following Barajas et al. (2009) we also distinguish between bad and good credit booms. For other
procedures see, for example, Mendoza and Terrones (2008, 2012) and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016).
7 These authors consider that a country experiences a systemic banking crisis if its banking system faces
significant signs of financial stress (indicated by significant bank runs, losses, and bank liquidations) and
moreover, if we observe significant policy interventions in response to the losses in the banking system.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the episodes and duration of credit booms
#Spells Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Threshold: 1.5
All countries 220 8.04 5.82 1 32
OECD countries 76 8.28 5.31 1 27
Non-OECD countries 144 7.91 6.08 1 32
Decades:
1975–1979 8 4.63 2.20 2 9
1980–1989 30 6.17 3.27 2 16
1990–1999 59 9.18 5.64 2 27
2000–2009 48 9.33 6.46 2 32
2010–2016 28 3.25 1.96 1 9
bad credit booms 55 10.62 6.74 2 32
good credit booms 165 7.18 5.22 1 32
Threshold: 1.75
All countries 199 8.26 6.00 1 32
OECD countries 64 8.73 5.60 1 27
Non-OECD countries 135 8.04 6.19 1 32
Decades:
1975–1979 7 5.00 2.08 3 9
1980–1989 27 6.30 3.39 2 16
1990–1999 54 9.35 5.78 2 27
2000–2009 43 9.70 6.74 2 32
2010–2016 25 3.04 2.07 1 9
bad credit booms 50 11.08 6.91 2 32
good credit booms 149 7.32 5.36 1 31
Threshold: 2.0
All countries 176 8.66 6.19 1 32
OECD countries 59 8.76 5.78 2 27
Non-OECD countries 117 8.61 6.41 1 32
Decades:
1975–1979 7 5.00 2.08 3 9
1980–1989 24 6.42 3.54 2 16
1990–1999 49 9.80 5.85 2 27
2000–2009 41 9.56 6.95 2 32
2010–2016 16 2.50 1.46 1 5
bad credit booms 49 11.20 6.93 2 32
good credit booms 127 7.68 5.60 1 31
This table reports the number of episodes/spells (#Spells), the mean duration (Mean), the standard deviation
(St.Dev.), the minimum (Min.) and the maximum (Max.) duration for credit booms. The data are quarterly and
comprises 67 countries over the period 1975q1-2016q4. Credit booms are identified using the works of
Gourinchas et al. (2001) and Barajas et al. (2009). According to their criteria, we consider that a credit boom
takes place when the deviation of the ratio of credit to GDP from its trend exceeds 1.5 times of its standard
deviation or the (year-on-year) growth in the credit-GDP ratio exceeds 20%. For robustness, we also allow for
two more restrictive thresholds: 1.75 and 2.0
List of Countries: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey,
Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela
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Depending on how restrictive the threshold is, we can identify between 176 and 220
credit boom episodes over our entire sample period. Around two-thirds of the episodes
took place in developing or emerging economies and, over time, most of the episodes
of lending booms occur in the 1990s. On average, credit booms last around eight
quarters but they are longer in the 1990s and 2000s (around 9 quarters). However, their
mean duration is very similar when we compare the OECD with the Non-OECD
countries.
From Table 1 we can also infer that not all lending booms end up in a crisis. In fact, only
approximately 1 out of every 4 credit booms coincides or is followed by systemic banking
crises. Another interesting feature is that, on average, those booms last more (11 quarters)
than those that end up in a soft landing (around 7 quarters).
Barajas et al. (2009), Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016) and Meng and Gonzalez (2017), among
others, notice that bad credit booms are larger and usually last longer than good credit
booms. Avisual analyses of the histograms reporting the duration of all, bad and good credit
booms presented in Fig. 1, seems to confirm this idea: a higher proportion of good booms
lasts less than two years while a substantial fraction of bad ones still lasts more than two
years (the sample average of all credit booms). However, we do not know whether this
difference is statistically relevant or not. This is an important issue that this study intends to
address using a proper duration model.
As credit booms have been consistently associated with sharp increases in capital
inflows that consequently raise the supply of loanable funds (Calderón and Kubota
2012; Gourinchas and Obstfeld 2012) and ultimately led to financial crises,8 the growth
rate of foreign direct investment (FDIgr) is used as proxy for this inflow of capital in
our duration model. We expect them to be positively associated with the duration of
credit booms. A better economic environment can also promote the build-up credit
booms (Mendoza and Terrones 2008, 2012; Baron and Xiong 2017; Meng and
Gonzales, 2017) and in that sense make them longer. To account for this effect, the
growth rate of real GDP (GDPgr) is also added to the model. Moreover, the duration of
credit booms might also be driven by external accounts. Meng and Gonzales (2017)
show that an improved current account balance favours the occurrence of credit booms.
However, this does imply that they will be longer. A positive stance may mean more
cash or deposits available and less need for further credit. So, credit booms might be
shorter when the current account balance improves. This effect is accounted for by
adding the current account balance as percentage of GDP (CA_GDP) to the model.9
2 Empirical analysis
The findings of this study are discussed in this section. We start by presenting the main
results on the time dynamics of bad and good credit booms; these are followed by a
sensitivity analysis. Then we dig deeper into the build-up and unwinding phases of credit
booms.
8 See Jordà et al. (2011), Schularick and Taylor (2012), Boissay et al. (2016) and Jordà et al. (2016).
9 Data for foreign direct investment are obtained from IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics; Datastream and
national sources are used for real GDP series (in local currency); Current account as percentage of GDP is
obtained from the World Development Indicators.
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#Spells=220;   Mean=8.0;   Std.Dev.=5.8
#Spells=55;   Mean=10.6;   Std.Dev.=6.7
#Spells=165;   Mean=7.2;   Std.Dev.=5.2
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Fig. 1 Duration of credit booms
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2.1 Main results
The main empirical results from the estimation of the discrete-time duration model are
summarised in Table 2. In this case, credit booms are identified using Gourinchas et al.
(2001) and Barajas et al. (2009) criteria with a 1.5 threshold. The estimate of pmeasures the
magnitude of the duration dependence and a one-sided test is used to detect the presence of
positive duration dependence, i.e. whether p> 1 or not; the sign ‘+’ indicates significance at
a 5% level.
The results provide strong evidence of positive duration dependence for credit booms.
Thismeans that the likelihood of a credit boom ending increases as the time goes by, i.e. with
its “age”. Hence, “older” credit booms are at a higher risk of ending than “younger” ones.
Taking for example the estimate of p in regression 4, we observe that a 1 % increase in time
(i.e. the length of the boom or its “age”) is associated with a 2% increase in the hazard of a
credit boom ending.10 Moreover, when the economic controllers are included, p has proven
to be statistically equal to 2. This means that the second-order derivative of the baseline
hazard function indicates the presence of constant positive duration dependence. Putting it
differently, the probability of a credit boom ending at time t, given that it lasted until that
period (“age”), increases over time at a constant rate.11
We start by estimating a very basic specification without accounting for any regressors,
fixed or time effects (column 1). Then to account for countries heterogeneity, a dummy that
takes the value of 1 for OECD countries, and 0 for the others, is added (OECD).12 However,
no significant difference is detected in the mean duration of credit booms between OECD
and Non-OECD countries. Decade-dummies are also added to control for time-effects, one
for each decade (Dec70,Dec80,Dec90,Dec00,Dec10;Dec70 is the base-category).13 The
results show that credit booms were, on average, more prone to last longer in the 1990s and
2000s but they have become shorter in more recent years.
Regression 3 accounts for important economic controllers in the credit booms; dynam-
ics: foreign direct investment growth (FDIgr), output growth (GDPgr), and current account
balance as percentage of GDP. These variables are lagged one period to avoid simultaneity
problems.
The expansion of FDI inflows has proven to be positively associated with the
likelihood of a credit boom ending over time, i.e. it is associated with shorter
credit booms. This is in line with Calderon and Kubota’s (2012) finding that FDI
inflows are negatively related to the likelihood of credit booms. Hence, these
capital inflows may indeed contribute to shorter booms because these flows
might be initially supported by foreign credit, increasing the country’s liquidity
10 For further details on the interpretation of the duration dependence parameter, see Allison (2014).
11 For details on the second-order derivative see Castro (2010).
12 Initially, we tested for the presence of random and country-specific effects but the tests showed that none of
these effects were statistically significant. Those results are available upon request. In fact, Claessens et al.
(2012) note that with a limited number of observations/spells per country fixed effects may have to be ruled
out. Hence, to allow for any eventual heterogeneity the OECD dummy is used instead.
13 In a sensitivity analysis, yearly dummies will be used instead of decades to account for the time-effects. As
credit boom spells do not overlap all the time over the panel of individuals and period analysed, the use of
year-dummies will be undermined by the lack of (regressors) variability in some years and the consequent loss
of observations. Away to overcome this problem is using decade dummies to account for time-effects. As we
have more spells/observations within each decade, the variability of the regressors is not an issue and we can
estimate the model without losing observations.
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before translating into new credits and due to the instability and uncertainty they
can generate (Calderón and Kubota 2012). On the contrary, credit booms last
longer when the economy is growing faster: a one percentage point increase in
GDP growth leads to a decrease of 9.5% in the hazard of a credit boom ending,
i.e. it has a significant negative impact on the likelihood of a credit boom ending
Table 2 The length of credit booms’ outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
p 1.455+,d 1.712+,d 1.841+,d 1.993+,c 2.079+,c 1.900+,c 2.041+,c
(0.070) (0.079) (0.092) (0.104) (0.112) (0.175) (0.135)
Δp −0.338***
(0.082)
p +Δp 1.741+,d
(0.107)
BadCB −0.786***
(0.179)
FDIgr 0.028** 0.024** 0.026** 0.036 0.024**
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.039) (0.012)
GDPgr −0.082*** −0.100*** −0.098*** −0.127*** −0.095***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.032) (0.021)
CA_GDP 0.036*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.025 0.048***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.028) (0.016)
OECD −0.126 −0.196 −0.188 −0.171 −0.099 −0.236
(0.148) (0.159) (0.158) (0.158) (0.304) (0.186)
Dec80 −0.302 −0.377 −0.214 −0.224 −0.682 −0.043
(0.228) (0.252) (0.253) (0.253) (0.524) (0.288)
Dec90 −0.695*** −0.876*** −0.727*** −0.739*** −0.862** −0.667***
(0.188) (0.205) (0.208) (0.207) (0.400) (0.247)
Dec00 −1.338*** −1.220*** −1.213*** −1.263*** −1.040** −1.251***
(0.207) (0.223) (0.221) (0.220) (0.510) (0.250)
Dec10 0.897*** 0.904*** 0.986*** 0.990*** 0.185 1.136***
(0.240) (0.258) (0.260) (0.261) (0.726) (0.284)
#Obs. 1781 1781 1638 1638 1638 547 1091
#Spells 220 220 200 200 200 52 148
LogL −649.4 −608.1 −531.4 −521.0 −522.3 −142.8 −376.4
SBIC 1313.7 1268.6 1136.9 1123.4 1026.0 348.6 822.7
Estimations considering Gourinchas et al. (2001) and Barajas et al. (2009) criteria with threshold equal to 1.5.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * - statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively; + indicates that p is significantly higher than one using a one-sided test with a 5%
significance level; d, c, and i indicate decreasing, constant or increasing positive duration dependence,
respectively; △p is the estimated difference in the duration dependence parameter between bad and good
credit booms; p +Δp is the value of the duration dependence parameter for bad credit booms. The Schwartz
Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) is computed as follows: SBIC= -2LogL + kLogN, where k is the
number of regressors and N is the number of observations (spells). Columns 6 and 7 present separate
regression results for bad and good credit booms, respectively
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over time.14 Finally, a better current account position (CA_GDP) is found to be
associated with shorter credit booms. This result can be justified by the fact that
an improvement in the current account balance means more cash/liquidity avail-
able and less need for further credit, hence, implying shorter credit booms. All
these results are in line with our expectations.
To test whether bad credit booms are statistically longer than benign ones, a
dummy that takes the value of 1 for those that end up in a banking crisis, and 0
otherwise (BadCB), is added to the model. The results show that bad credit booms
have a lower likelihood of ending, i.e. they are significantly longer than good ones
(see column 4). More specifically, bad credit booms have a hazard of ending that
is 54.4% (=100*[exp(−0.786)-1]) lower than good ones.
Next, allowing for a change in the duration dependence parameter (Δp)
between good (p) and bad credit boom episodes (p +Δp), we observe a signif-
icant difference in the duration dependence parameter between them (see column
5): p is statistically lower for credit booms that are followed by a banking crisis.
Moreover, good credit booms present constant positive duration dependence
while for bad ones it is decreasing. Hence, the likelihood of bad credit booms
ending increases over time at a lower rate than good ones. In other words, this
provides further evidence that the former has a higher propensity to last longer
than the latter. Finally, separate regressions for those different episodes confirm
this trend (see columns 6 and 7). Overall, these findings are in line with what we
observe in Table 1 and provide the lacking statistical evidence for what has been
argued (but not proved yet) in the literature: credit booms that end up or are
followed by banking crises are indeed statistically longer than those that land
softly.15
2.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In this sub-section, we provide a sensitivity analysis where specification 4 in Table 2 is
used as baseline. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 3.
The size of the credit boom, as it builds up over time, is another issue that might be
linked to its duration. To control for this potential link, the lag of the ratio of credit to
GDP (Credit_GDP) is added to the model as a proxy for the magnitude of the boom.16
The results show that the size is negatively associated to duration, but the effect is only
marginally significant (see column 1 in Table 3). At the same time, this effect seems to
be interrelated with the effect of FDIgr, which becomes statistically insignificant; the
other results remain unchanged though. As noticed above, capital inflows may fuel new
14 According to Allison (2014), this estimate is obtained as 100*[exp(b)-1]. This corresponds to the percentage
change in the hazard for a unit increase in the respective regressor. For the purpose of interpretation, b was
chosen to be the estimated coefficient on GDPgr in regression 4 (b = −0.1).
15 In the Annex are provided some robustness checks where different thresholds for the identification of credit
booms (1.75 and 2.0) are considered (see Table 5.); a different definition and detrending technique are also
used (see Table 6). In Table 6 we compare the results from regressions considering credit booms identified
using the Hodrick-Prescott filter and Hamilton (2018) filter (both with threshold equal to 1.5 but without using
the 20% growth rate of L/y as an additional marker of credit booms). The results reported in these additional
tables corroborate all the findings presented above.
16 Note that in this duration analysis we only use the spells of credit boom, hence the magnitude of this ratio
can work as a good proxy for the size of the boom.
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credits, hence FDIgr might be enough to account for the size effect. Moreover,
Credit_GDP is used to identify credit booms and its duration, so for that reason it
might technically be adding some bias to the analysis.
Next, we control for further lags of FDIgr and GDPgr to capture any additional
missing past information. The results strongly suggest that one lag of those
variables is enough to capture their effect on the duration of credit booms. In
regressions 3–5, FDIgr is replaced by the growth rate of portfolio investment
inflows (PIgr), other investment inflows (OIgr) and total inflows (TIgr), respec-
tively. The results show that OIgr also affects the duration of credit booms in the
same direction as FDIgr. This finding is consistent with the idea that countries
with a lower equity-debt ratio in foreign flows tend to experience lending booms
more frequently (Calderon and Kubota 2012). As that lower ratio seems to be
somehow driven by a higher amount of cross-border banking flows, an accelera-
tion in OI inflows will make credit booms more frequent (Calderon and Kubota
2012) and, consequently, shorter.
Even though the mean duration of credit booms has not proven to be significantly
different between OECD and non-OECD countries, it would be interesting to analyse
whether differences arise regarding bad credit booms. To control for this effect, we start
by interacting BadCB with OECD (see regression 6). The results are in line with what
we have found for all credit booms. Moreover, no differences are found in the duration
dependence dynamics either (regression 7). Even when we split the sample into OECD
(regression 8) and non-OECD countries (regression 9) results show identical duration
dependence dynamics and a higher propensity for bad credit booms lasting longer than
good ones in both groups.
As a final exercise, yearly dummies are used instead of decades to account for the time-
effects (see columns 10 and 11). As expected, for the reasonsmentioned above, the number
of observations and events decreases. Nevertheless, our findings and conclusions remain
qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged.
2.3 Build-Up and Unwinding Phases of Credit Booms
In this sub-section we dig deeper in the analysis of credit boom dynamics by
assessing whether their build-up and unwinding phases are longer when credit
expansions end up in a banking crisis.17 This analysis will help us to understand
where the dynamics for longer and harmful credit booms is generated: sooner in
the process, i.e. in the build-up phase, or later when credit booms unwind.
The results reported in Table 4 show that bad credit booms exhibit longer build-
ups and longer unwindings when compared to other credit expansions (see columns
2 and 5). Allowing for a change in the duration dependence parameter (columns 3
and 6), we reach a similar conclusion: in each phase, the likelihood of termination
17 Build-ups are defined as the initial phase of the credit boom. They correspond to the period between the
start of the credit boom and the beginning of the unwinding phase. They last, on average, 5.7 quarters; the
average is higher for bad (7.5 quarters) than for good credit booms (5.0 quarters). The unwinding phase starts
when credit-to-GDP growth becomes negative (and stays negative for at least two quarters) while the credit
boom is still alive; when this does not happen during the credit boom phase, the unwinding is considered to be
the last quarter of the boom. Unwindings last, on average, 2.4 quarters; the average is also higher for bad (3.2
quarters) than for good credit booms (2.1 quarters).
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increases over time at a lower rate for bad credit booms than for good ones.
Moreover, the upward and downward phases of good credit booms exhibit positive
duration dependence, while no duration dependence is observed in any phase related
to bad credit expansions. All this additional evidence is corroborating the conclusion
above that the duration process of credit booms that end up or are followed by
banking crises are fundamentally different than those that end softly. As differences
in the duration dynamics between good and bad credit booms are detected in the
build-up phase of credit booms, a closer monitorization of the build-up of credit and
their duration by policymakers is fundamental for the timing of the implementation
of policy measures aimed at mitigating their potential nefarious consequences.
Table 4 The duration of the build-up and unwinding of credit booms
Build-up Unwinding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
p 1.292+,d 1.334+,d 1.367+,d 1.341+,d 1.378+,d 1.508+,d 1.607+,d
(0.088) (0.090) (0.096) (0.137) (0.139) (0.156) (0.158)
Δp −0.169* −0.367** −0.468**
(0.095) (0.182) (0.194)
p +Δp 1.197 1.141 1.139
(0.128) (0.177) (0.187)
BadCB −0.514*** −0.444**
(0.169) (0.188)
Buildup 0.023
(0.016)
FDIgr 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.024** 0.020* 0.022* 0.026*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
GDPgr −0.082*** −0.089*** −0.083*** 0.029 0.013 0.017 0.018
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
CA_GDP 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.032** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.046***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
OECD −0.034 0.001 −0.009 −0.475*** −0.510*** −0.508*** −0.518***
(0.164) (0.165) (0.165) (0.166) (0.170) (0.168) (0.173)
Dec80 0.113 0.217 0.182 −0.312 −0.256 −0.279 −0.216
(0.292) (0.294) (0.295) (0.264) (0.264) (0.261) (0.265)
Dec90 −0.201 −0.041 −0.097 −0.604*** −0.546*** −0.583*** −0.626***
(0.250) (0.256) (0.258) (0.205) (0.207) (0.205) (0.208)
Dec00 −0.275 −0.190 −0.242 −0.549*** −0.577*** −0.603*** −0.672***
(0.257) (0.260) (0.258) (0.211) (0.213) (0.216) (0.222)
Dec10 1.229*** 1.304*** 1.283*** 0.394 0.309 0.355 0.262
(0.289) (0.291) (0.293) (0.270) (0.273) (0.271) (0.306)
#Obs. 1167 1167 1167 463 463 463 452
#Spells 198 198 198 193 193 193 182
LogL −501.1 −496.3 −499.5 −298.4 −295.4 −296.3 −286.2
SBIC 1072.9 1070.2 1076.6 658.2 658.4 660.1 645.7
See Table 2. Build-up phases correspond to the period between the start of the credit boom and the beginning
of the unwinding phase. Unwinding phases of the credit booms start when credit-to-GDP growth becomes
negative (and stays negative for at least two quarters); when this does not happen during the credit boom
phase, the unwinding is considered to be the last quarter of the boom. Mean duration (standard-deviation) of
build-ups is 5.7 (5.4) quarters; Mean duration (standard-deviation) of unwindings is 2.4 (1.9) quarters
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There are two additional results in Table 4 that are worth to mention. First, the
evidence in favour of duration dependence is stronger for unwindings than build-ups.
This implies that unwindings are shorter than build-ups.18 Unwindings are the fade out
process of credit booms. Hence, it is not surprising that the likelihood of these events
ending increases over time at a faster pace. Their length is also shortened by capital
inflows growth and sounder external accounts. Build-ups, however, are more signifi-
cantly associated with the expansion of output. As this is an important driver of the
duration of credit booms, it is also reasonable that its effects are stronger in the initial
phase of the credit expansion, contributing for their build-up.
Second, as there might be a link between build-ups and unwindings of credit
booms, an additional regressor was included in the last column of Table 4: the
duration of the build-up that preceded the unwinding (Buildup). The results show
that the unwinding dynamics is not influenced by the length of the previous build-
up. Hence, the unwinding phases are mainly driven by the (positive) duration
dependence dynamics and are more prone to last longer in the group of more
developed (OECD) countries.
3 Conclusions
Several papers in the literature have stated that credit expansions that end up in
banking crises are usually longer than those that do not. However, proper
statistical evidence for this is scarce. This paper employs a discrete-time dura-
tion model to assess the relationship between the length of credit booms and
their outcome using a quarterly dataset covering 67 countries from 1975q1 to
2016q4.
The empirical analysis shows that harmful credit expansions are indeed more
prone to last longer than those that land softly. In particular, the time dynamics
between them is found to be different: while bad credit booms present decreasing
duration dependence, good ones run to its end (over time) at a faster pace. This
provides the missing statistical evidence for what is argued in the literature.
Moreover, we also show that this dynamic begins when credit booms build-up
and continues when they unwind. Both the expansion and the termination phases
of harmful credit surges are longer than for innocuous ones. The results also
provide evidence that, in general, the resolution phases are shorter than the
build-ups.
This paper shows that duration can be seen as an early warning instrument to
evaluate the benign or malignant nature of credit booms. Nevertheless, the length
of a credit boom alone is not enough to suggest the nature of a credit expansion. It
is a symptom that depends on other symptoms to get a trustworthy diagnostic. For
example, we observe that capital inflows, economic growth and the external
accounts stance help to explain the length of credit booms. Still, their duration
can work as a reliable wake-up call, since it has been the most consistent
distinctive characteristic highlighted in the literature.
18 In fact, in our sample we observe that the mean duration of build-ups is 5.7 quarters while for unwindings it
is only 2.4 quarters. The duration analysis confirms this dynamic for shorter unwindings.
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A closer monitorization of the banking system when a boom exceeds their
average duration (eight quarters in our sample) is important as credit booms are
more likely to unfold in a systemic banking crisis when they surpass that “age”.
Nevertheless, as differences in the duration dynamics between good and bad
credit booms are detected earlier, in their build-up phase – as our results show –
that monitorization is advisable to take place sooner, as a precautionary measure.
We would suggest the average duration of the build-up of credit booms (i.e.
around one year and a half) as a good rule-of thumb for policymakers to start
monitoring episodes of credit booms. Nevertheless, we think that the use of
invasive policy measures that interfere directly with the economy and the
financial sector requires additional economic information. The relevant results
provided by this study suggest that early warning systems should not be built
exclusively around economic variables, but also include the duration aspect of
credit expansions.
As a final word of advice, we claim that the use of invasive policy
measures that interfere directly with the economy and the financial sector
should require additional economic information. The strong results provided
by this study suggest that early warning systems should not be built exclu-
sively around economic variables, but also include the duration aspect of
credit expansions.
Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank three anonymous referees for their very insightful
comments and suggestions.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Agnello L, Castro V, Sousa R (2013) What determines the duration of a fiscal consolidation program? J Int
Money Financ 37:113–134
Agnello L, Castro V, Sousa R (2015) Booms, busts and normal times in the housing market. J Bus Econ Stat
33(1):25–45
Agnello L, Castro V, Sousa R (2018) The legacy and the tyranny of time: exit and re-entry of sovereigns to
international capital markets. J Money Credit Bank forthcoming
Allison P (1982) Discrete-time methods for the analysis of event histories. Sociol Methodol 13:61–98
Allison P (2014) Quantitative applications in the social sciences: event history and survival analysis. SAGE
Publications, Thousand Oaks
Arena, M., Bouza, S., Dabla-Norris, M. E., Gerling, M. K., and Njie, L. (2015). Credit booms and
macroeconomic dynamics: stylized facts and lessons for low-income countries (IMF working paper 15/
11). International Monetary Fund
Avdjiev, S., Binder, S., and Sousa, R., 2018. External debt composition and domestic credit cycles. European
Stability Mechanism, Working-paper series, 28
Barajas, A., Dell’Ariccia, G., and Levchenko, A., 2009. Credit booms: the good, the bad, and the ugly.
Unpublished manuscript, International Monetary Fund (Washington, DC)
Baron M, Xiong W (2017) Credit Expansion and Neglected Crash Risk. Q J Econ 132(2):713–764
Boissay F, Collard F, Smets F (2016) Booms and banking crises. J Polit Econ 124(2):489–538
Castro V., Martins R.
Calderón C, Kubota M (2012) Gross inflows gone wild: gross capital inflows, credit booms and crises. World
Bank policy research working paper no. 6270
Castro V (2010) The duration of economic expansions and recessions: more than duration dependence. J
Macroecon 32:347–365
Castro, V., and Kubota, M., 2013. Duration dependence and change-points in the likelihood of credit booms
ending. Policy research working paper 6475, The World Bank
Castro V, Martins R (2013) Is there duration dependence in Portuguese local governments' tenure? Eur J Polit
Econ 31:26–39
Castro V, Martins R (2018) Why are credit booms sometimes sweet and sometimes sour? University of
Coimbra, CeBERWP no. 14
Castro V, Martins R (2019) The political and institutional determinants of credit booms. Oxf Bull Econ Stat
81(5):1144–1178
Claessens S, Ayhan Kose M, Terrones ME (2012) How do business and financial cycles interact? J Int Econ
87(1):178–190
Dell'Ariccia G, Igan D, Laeven L, Tong H (2016) Credit booms and macrofinancial stability. Econ Policy
31(86):299–355
Elekdag S, Wu Y (2013) Rapid credit growth in emerging markets: boon or boom-bust? Emerg Mark Financ
Trade 49(5):45–62
Gourinchas P-O, Valdes R, Landerretche O (2001) Lending booms: Latin America and the world. Economia
1(2):47–99
Gourinchas P-O, Obstfeld M (2012) Stories of the twentieth century for the twenty-first. Am Econ J
Macroecon 4(1):226–265
Hamilton J (2018) Why you should never use the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Rev Econ Stat 100(5):831–843
Jordà Ò, Schularick M, Taylor A (2011) Financial crises, credit booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of
lessons. IMF Economic Review 59(2):340–378
Jordà Ò, Schularick M, Taylor A (2016) Sovereigns versus banks: credit, crises, and consequences. J Eur Econ
Assoc 14(1):45–79
Laeven L, Valencia F (2008) Systemic banking crises: a new database. International Monetary Fund working
paper 08/224
Laeven L, Valencia F (2010) Resolution of banking crises: the good, the bad, and the ugly. International
Monetary Fund working paper 10/146
Laeven L, Valencia F (2012) Systemic banking crises database: an update. International Monetary Fund
working paper 12/163
Mendoza E, Terrones M (2008) An anatomy of credit booms: evidence frommacro aggregates and micro data.
NBER working paper no. 14049
Mendoza E, Terrones M (2012) An anatomy of credit booms and their demise. NBER working paper no.
18379
Meng C, Gonzalez RL (2017) Credit booms in developing countries: are they different from those in advanced
and emerging market countries? Open Econ Rev 28(3):547–579
Prentice R, Gloeckler L (1978) Regression analysis of grouped survival data with application to the breast
cancer data. Biometrics 34:57–67
Amri PD, R., Greg M., Willett, T. D. (2016) Capital surges and credit booms: how tight is the relationship?
Open Econ Rev 27(4):637–670
Schularick M, Taylor A (2012) Credit booms gone bust: monetary policy, leverage cycles, and financial crises,
1870-2008. Am Econ Rev 102(2):1029–1061
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
Riding the Wave of Credit: Are Longer Expansions Really a Bad Omen?
